Possible Scenarios for How the War in Ukraine Will End – Part 1

AN ENDLESS WAR?

It is difficult to imagine peace during war. This is particularly true at present when Russia has dug in for a long war and continues to target drones and missiles on Ukrainian cities, killing and maiming civilians and inflicting untold damage on the country’s economy.

Understandably, many Ukrainians fear not just a long war, but a potentially ‘endless’ war. As the Russian historian Sergei Medvedev has observed, Russia finally found its ultimate national idea after a search lasting three decades – since the collapse of the USSR – and that idea is war.

For today’s Russian authorities, war is a tool for preserving the cohesion of society and ensuring the legitimacy of their rule even if this requires increased repression. However, although the Putin regime is brittle like most personal autocracies that lack reliable mechanisms for succession, the country appears far from a situation comparable to 1917 when war weakened Tsar Nicolas II’s grip on power and made revolution unstoppable. On the surface, Russia appears both equipped and motivated to continue the war for several years if necessary.

The risk of a long war for Ukraine is that the country will struggle to consolidate the peace that finally emerges because of the long-term damage to its human and social capital from deaths, migration and trauma, not to mention the destruction and dislocation of its key economic assets.

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Predictions are not the purpose of this paper. It considers instead how the war might stop or end, and the condition Ukraine will be in when this point is reached. It seeks to identify the practical challenges that post-war Ukraine is likely to face and how these could impact its future security and stability.

The strategic challenge that will confront Ukraine when martial law is lifted is whether the country will be able to maintain sufficient unity and resolve to strengthen its institutions and create the level of economic growth that will allow it to recover and defend itself against future attack. Ukraine will need to restore a functioning parliamentary-presidential system in line with its constitution, including reactivating checks and balances between and within the branches of power, ensuring media freedom and full access to public information as well as decentralizing authority.

To rebuild the economy and create the underlying strength to resist further Russian aggression, Ukraine must dismantle the deeply entrenched system of crony capitalism (systema) that was such a strong brake on consolidating the country’s independence from the mid-1990s up to 2022.

ASSUMPTIONS

Since the war is existential both for Ukraine and for the Putin regime, there are strong reasons to believe that it might continue for a long while despite fatigue on both sides and the limited capacity of Western countries to continue to equip and finance Ukraine’s war effort at the necessary level.

While Vladimir Putin controls the levers of power, it is difficult to see a recalibration of Moscow’s strategic goals in Ukraine. He has committed Russia to expanding its territorial gains in Donbas, ‘demilitarizing’ Ukraine, changing the country’s leadership (denazification) and forcing it to accept neutrality. The goal is the full abolition of Ukrainian sovereignty.

Ukraine is not Finland in 1939. On the contrary, it is viewed by wide sections of Russian society as an inalienable part of the country’s identity as a European power and, therefore, as synonymous with Russia. For the Russian elites as well as the public, settling for less than Ukraine’s surrender would not amount to victory and could call into question the huge price paid by the country in terms of human and economic losses and the damage to its reputation.

Even if some form of truce is achieved, this does not mean that the war will stop as evidenced by the ill-fated Minsk Agreements (2014 and 2015), which were heavily lobbied by France and Germany as the path to peace. Poor diplomatic drafting meant that the two sides at war were able to interpret the provisions of the agreements differently. This led to a reduction of hostilities rather than the end of the war that Russia began in response to the February 2014 ‘Revolution of Dignity’.

However, a peace agreement leading to sharply reduced levels of fighting would create the possibility for Ukraine to lift martial law and hold overdue parliamentary and presidential elections.

SCENARIOS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR

‘Long war’– An attritional conflict giving each side the possibility to exhaust the other. Ukraine would continue to fight and try to rebuild at the same time, while incurring ever greater human losses on the battlefield and to migration.

‘Frozen conflict’ – An armistice that would stabilize the front line and allow both sides to regroup and rebuild their depleted forces in preparation for further fighting. There would be no agreement on Ukraine’s future military status or the size of its armed forces. Ukraine would remain formally committed to the goal of full restoration of its 1991 borders.

‘Victory for Ukraine’ – A change in Western policy leading to allies providing the arms and military support that would allow Ukraine to force the Russian Army back to at least the demarcation line of 23 February 2022. A Russian retreat, particularly if its hold on Crimea were jeopardized, could have dramatic political consequences in Russia itself, leading perhaps to a period of instability followed by radical reforms and eventual normalization of ties with the West. A prolonged period of Russian introspection would enable Ukraine to carry out deep reforms and accelerate the Europeanization of state institutions, leading to a realistic prospect of joining the EU and improving its overall security situation, perhaps with the possibility of rapid integration into NATO.

‘Defeat for Ukraine’ – Ukraine’s acceptance of Russian terms of surrender (change of government, demilitarization, neutrality) and de facto partition, including recognition of territorial losses to Russia, would only be possible in the case of a significant withdrawal of Western support for Ukraine and a military collapse. Theoretically, this could force to power a ‘pragmatic’ government in Kyiv prepared to accept significant territorial concessions to save Ukraine from further bloodshed and destruction. However, it would create a high risk of de-centralized insurgencies in the territories annexed by Russia and prolonged instability in the rest of the country.

SCENARIO DRIVERS

The extent to which each scenario might come to fruition will depend on three factors:

• The capacity and willingness of Ukraine’s Western allies to sustain financial and military support for the country and provide long-term security guarantees.
• Ukraine’s ability to maintain popular support for the continuing war while mobilizing and deploying forces in sufficient quantities.
• In the case of Russia, the continued absence of opposition to the war on the part of elites and society at large.

Despite the obvious asymmetries of army size, economic power and mobilization potential that have made Ukraine the underdog in this war, the country still retains one vital advantage over its adversary. Ukrainians are motivated by what they are fighting for. They have mobilized as a society to defend their independence. By contrast, Russian soldiers are fighting more for money and less for their country.

While the Kremlin views the war as existential for Russia, there is no evidence that this view is widely supported in Russian society even if a majority believes that the ‘special military operation’ is justified.

Although Russia has much larger resources to sustain a long war, Moscow’s cautious approach to mobilization, evidenced by its recruitment of soldiers for the war mainly from the provinces rather than the big cities and its clear reluctance to mobilize further, points to the Kremlin’s realization that there are limits to the willingness of Russians to rally around the flag.

The incursion of Ukrainian forces into Kursk region in August 2024 did not trigger a wave of patriotism and there were no floods of volunteers wanting to expel the invader. It is notable too that among the supporters of the war, there are different camps, including so-called ‘turbo patriots.’ Some of the latter have consistently criticized the Russian leadership’s strategy and tactics for prosecuting the war.

Society’s ability to fill in gaps left by government structures can also be a critical factor in driving the reforms needed to raise the quality of Ukraine’s overall resilience and make it sustainable over the long-term.

Unlike Russia, Ukraine’s resilience is built on society’s capacity for self-organization that is derived from the strong horizontal links in its social structure. This quality has been a significant force multiplier and has the potential to remain so although Ukraine faces obvious challenges to mobilize and train enough soldiers to keep

the army fighting effectively. Society’s ability to fill in gaps left by government structures can also be a critical factor in driving the reforms needed to raise the quality of Ukraine’s overall resilience and make it sustainable over the long-term.

The Ukrainian partisan operations underway in territories occupied by Russia since the start of the full-scale invasion are a reminder that armed resistance to Soviet rule in western parts of the country – incorporated into the USSR at the end of the Second World War – continued into the mid-1950s. Even if Ukraine were to be formally defeated, this could still be a very long war.

DETERMINANTS OF PEACE

For Ukraine, there are five key variables that will determine the nature of any peace arrangement.

• How much territory it will control.
• The extent of economic damage.
• The level of population loss.
• The level of security it can maintain.
• The level of investment it must make in its defence to deter further aggression.

At present, it is too early to say whether Western countries will eventually agree to underwrite Ukraine’s security. For now, neither NATO nor the EU has a definition of victory or a long-term view of how to provide for Ukraine’s security.

All five variables apply to the possible outcomes of the war.

‘Long war’

The ‘long war’ scenario would require Ukraine to continue fighting with limited resources while trying to rebuild damaged infrastructure and sustain the economy and social welfare system. Lifting martial law would not be possible in these conditions unless the fighting became less intense over a long period, influenced perhaps by internal events in Russia, or Moscow committing forces

to another theatre as it did in Syria in 2015, a move that appeared to distract Putin from immediate further intervention in Ukraine. ‘Long war’ would condemn Ukraine to further destruction of its economic, human and social capital, further limit possibilities for economic growth and slow down the reforms needed for EU accession.

A combination of society’s exhaustion, its growing impoverishment and tensions between the civilian and military authorities over resource choices – amid fraying relations with Western partners because of their limited support – could create a dangerous political cocktail. Some Ukrainian commentators fear that this situation could lead to anarchy and civil war as experienced previously in Ukrainian history. However, this dark scenario is unlikely since such a large majority of Ukrainians holds Russia responsible for the war and to date this unity in society has defied Russian efforts to destabilize it from within.

Ukraine’s Western allies would succeed in preserving a consensus to continue providing military and economic assistance to Ukraine, but the overall levels of support would gradually decline because of other spending pressures. Proportionally, US support would be reduced while Europe’s would increase.

‘Frozen conflict’

Faced with the choice between a ceasefire that might give a few years’ respite and a continued war of attrition, many Ukrainians might understandably opt for the former if they believed that Western support was waning and no immediate progress on the battlefield was possible.

After all, the Minsk Agreements, even if they did not stop the fighting in Donbas, bought time for Ukraine to introduce key reforms that strengthened state institutions, including the armed forces and security services, and helped create resilience capacity at the regional and local levels. It is widely believed in Ukrainian policy circles that without the decentralization reform that began in 2015, which devoted significant decision-making power to the local level, Ukraine would not have been able to withstand the full-scale Russian invasion.

If Putin genuinely intended to restart negotiations, Volodymyr Zelensky’s challenge would be to sell a ceasefire domestically. He would need to explain to the country why the price of a pause in hostilities would outweigh the costs of continuing

to fight with dwindling supplies of weapons and growing uncertainty about the true intentions of Western allies. The price to be paid would likely be the acceptance

of the front line at the time and the need to abandon in the short to medium term any prospect of regaining territory ceded after the start of the full-scale invasion.

Such a move would spark accusations of defeatism in the army, the security services and large sections of society. This would be advantageous to Moscow because it would severely weaken Zelensky’s legitimacy and divide the public. It would bring out into the open frustration with the decisions that led to heavy military losses, including the defense of Bakhmut and Avdiivka.

Divisions on the issue would extend to Ukraine’s allies. Complaints in Kyiv that some Western countries forced Ukraine to the negotiating table would increase tensions within NATO and spark concerns about the capability of the alliance to provide credible defense of the Baltic states and other parts of Central Europe.

The acceptance of a ceasefire deal would have significant implications for the presidential and parliamentary elections that would follow the lifting of martial law, assuming the ceasefire held.

If Zelensky were to seek re-election, he would face severe examination of why the country was poorly prepared for the invasion, why Mariupol, for example, was not evacuated and why Russian forces were able to seize large swathes of Kherson region at the outset of the full-scale war. It would not be hard to foresee public anger leading to criminal investigations of those civilian and military leaders responsible for the country’s defense, including potentially even Zelensky himself.

Perceptions of defeat would demoralize the army, demotivate society and spark accusations of the West’s betrayal of Ukraine that Russian propaganda would amplify. Admittedly, Zelensky and his generals could argue with justification that Western allies failed to provide the weapons that Ukraine needed when it needed them, and that the Russian Army was able to build battlefield defenses that even well-trained and -equipped Western armies would have struggled to overcome. Such fair explanations would probably count for little in an atmosphere of vicious recrimination that would bring new political players to the fore.

The ‘frozen conflict’ scenario would undoubtedly raise serious questions in Ukrainian society about Western allies’ commitment to continue supporting Ukraine, and

the sincerity of the EU’s invitation to Ukraine to join the organization. Perceptions of defeat would also bring a widespread sense of disillusionment with the country’s prospects and provoke further emigration. Not only would Zelensky’s personal ratings suffer greatly as noted above, his Servant of the People Party would cease to exist as a political force.

It would be hard to imagine that Putin would not use a pause in the fighting to try to rebuild the Russian Army, which has suffered such serious losses of equipment and personnel in Ukraine, while also seeking sanctions relief. The issues of sanctions, reparations and war crimes could become contentious in Ukraine, if Western allies were to attempt to soft-pedal them to improve relations with Moscow.

Defense spending would need to remain high to prepare the country for the likely resumption of hostilities and could lead to disagreements with Western partners anxious that Ukraine might inadvertently provoke further conflict with Russia.

The Western partners would be split on how to manage relations with Russia. Some would advocate the continuation of containment polices, while others would want to de-escalate tensions and try to restart relations.

‘Victory for Ukraine’

While Zelensky and his team would be crowned as heroes abroad, ‘victory’ would not guarantee Zelensky’s re-election if society felt that consolidation  of peace required a different type of leader. Zelensky is reportedly worried that he could repeat the fate of Winston Churchill as an inspirational wartime leader who saved the country but lost the election that followed.

Inflicting defeat on the Russian Army would give Ukrainians a massive confidence boost and encourage the return of refugees and greatly increase the likelihood that Ukraine would receive credible security guarantees from its Western partners. The reopening of Black Sea ports would restore the country’s export potential and help encourage investment in reconstruction.

‘Victory’ on the battlefield would by no means guarantee progress on dismantling systems. On the contrary, it might lead to a consolidation of the established model of governance but with a new group of economic players dictating the rules. However, the EU accession process would be a highly effective instrument for countering such efforts and breaking the grip of big business on politics and the government system.

Managing territories that had been occupied for a long period would be a particularly challenging task in terms of persuading refugees to return and removing collaborators from local administrations.

‘Victory’ would restore the confidence of Western countries in their ability to face down threats from authoritarian states to their values and institutions, even if the price had been paid with Ukrainian blood.

‘Defeat for Ukraine’

‘Defeat’ would have devastating consequences for Ukraine’s viability as an independent state and could lead to the country fracturing, driven in part by the movement of economically active people from occupied territories to safety in

the west of the country or abroad. Unless Ukraine could reconquer these territories in a relatively short space of time, the displacement of this section of society would risk becoming permanent.

A collapse of the armed forces would contribute to an overall weakening of central authority and increase the risk of the deeply feared outcome of anarchy. ‘Defeat’ would encourage the development of small-scale insurgencies against Russian rule and the use of violence against Ukrainian leaders ready to collaborate with Moscow along the lines already seen in the territories occupied by Russia since 2014. At the same time, there would be a risk of large numbers of Ukrainians swelling the ranks of the Russian Army either because they would be forced to join up by the occupation authorities, or because they would choose to serve voluntarily on account of their dire economic situation. De-population, the breakdown of public services in some cities and the paralysis of the economy would create a highly volatile situation that might draw in some neighboring countries to protect their borders and prevent the overspill of violence.

The moral authority of the US and its allies would be in tatters as countries in other parts of the world reflected on the meaning of assurances by G7 member states to support a country in distress ‘for as long as it takes’. NATO’s cohesion would also be severely tested with Central European member states confronted by a marked deterioration of their security situation and uncertain of US commitment to mutual defense.

Reprinted from the Chatham House report by John Lough. You can see the original article here.