By attacking, not defending… How did Israel compensate for the intelligence loss?

By attacking, not defending… How did Israel compensate for the intelligence loss?

This shift reflects how you invest Israel Its time and resources Over the past two decades, since going to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, Israel has meticulously prepared for another major conflict with the militant group and perhaps with Iran, its backer.

By contrast, Hamas was considered a less potent threat to Israel, and until shortly before the October 7 attack, senior officials were refusing to notice signs of an “imminent attack.”

Carmit Valensi, a senior fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, said: Tel Aviv“Our focus was largely on preparing for the confrontation with Hezbollah. We somewhat neglected the southern arena and the evolving situation with Hamas in Gaza.”

I left a chain Israeli attacks in Lebanon Over the past two weeks, Hezbollah has been in a state of “astonishment,” shocked by Israel’s ability to penetrate it.

The intense campaign launched by the Israeli foreign spy services, andMossadand military intelligence units, led to the destruction of Hezbollah’s leadership and the deterioration of its weapons arsenal.

The former director of the Israeli National Security Council told Avner Golov: “Israel’s success against Hezbollah compared to its failure regarding Hamas comes because the Israeli security services are better at attacking than defending.”

He added: “The essence of the Israeli security doctrine is to transfer the war to the enemy. With GazaIt was completely different. “We were surprised, so it was a failure.”

Israel has monitored Hezbollah’s arsenal buildup since the two sides signed a truce in 2006 after a month-long war.

At the time, many members of the Israeli security establishment were disappointed with the army’s performance in the war, as it had failed to inflict significant damage on Hezbollah.

As a result, the military sought to understand Hezbollah Better and reduce the military and financial support that Iran provides to the group, including through a campaign of air strikes on Syria.

In Gaza, by contrast, the Prime Minister embraced Benjamin Netanyahu strategy to contain Hamas in recent years, believing that the Palestinian group is focused on ruling Gaza and is not interested in a war with Israel.

The two sides fought a series of short conflicts following the Hamas takeover Gaza Strip In 2007, the group’s leader in the Strip, Yahya Sinwar, seemed to be more interested in improving the economic conditions of the Palestinian people.

There were signs that the US-designated terrorist group was planning an attack, including military exercises that foreshadowed the ways it stormed Israel on October 7.

But Israeli intelligence services downplayed the importance of the exercises as a threat to the public agitation Local.

The Israeli army relied on its confidence in the strength of the technologically advanced separation wall that it built to separate Gaza from Israeli territory.

Despite Israel’s long-standing efforts to curtail the sophistication of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, the Lebanese group has managed to amass a massive arsenal of weapons.

“There is a danger that Israel’s recent successes may make it feel overconfident,” said Valensi, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies.

She added, “Invasion Lebanon With forces, it may give Hezbollah the opportunity to demonstrate its military superiority on the ground.”

She said: “We have seen how challenging and difficult it is to eliminate a complex organization like Hamas. Hezbollah is a different story.”



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